Volume 04, Number 1 & 2, Spring, 1986

An unnecessary disaster

Challenger Dies, Free Space May Live

By Victoria Varga

For over twenty years the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was the one government agency that most people liked. For much of the American public "government" too often meant corruption, waste, mismanagement, stupidity, and political maneuvering. In contrast NASA epitomized adventure, a hopeful future, and the best "can do" attitude of the human (and particularly the American) spirit.

In the weeks following the January 28 explosion of the space shuttle Challenger, public perception seemed to change. As Morton Thiokol engineers and the president of Rockwell's space transportation and systems group, Rocco Petrone, stated that they had warned NASA of the dangers of a cold weather launch, those of us who were naive enough to believe that NASA was committed to safety were horrified. Our horror grew as we learned of the twisted chain of command that allowed these warnings to remain unheard by top NASA officials like Jesse Moore, Associate Administrator for Space Flight, and Arnold Aldrich, Space Shuttle Manager at Johnson Space Center.

But the faulty last-minute decisions by NASA middle-management are only the tip of a years-in-the-making iceberg of bad decisions. Since 1982, reported the March 10 issue of Time magazine, Thiokol and NASA engineers have known that the sealing at the solid rocket booster joints was unreliable at temperatures below 45 degrees Fahrenheit. Since the back-up seals were also unreliable, the "O"-ring seals were designated a "criticality 1" item, an item whose failure would lead to the loss of the mission. According to Time's Ed Magusony "the lack of a reliable back-up violated a long-time NASA principle," but the agency waived their "redundancy requirement" in March 1983 so that flights could continue.

In the February issue of the monthly newsletter, Commercial Space Report, editor Tom Brosz enlarged on the extent of the problem: "...there are apparently 829 items in the Shuttle system that have received such waivers—213 on the SRB [solid rocket booster] alone." In focusing on the "O"-rings, states Brosz, the Rogers commission is "overlooking the larger picture." It would be impossible to detail all of the information that Brosz includes in his six-page article. However, his main points are extremely important in demonstrating how political considerations have damaged the U.S. Space Program.

(1) In the first place, NASA should not have chosen a solid rocket booster for the shuttle. SRB'S may be necessary for the instant response required by the military, but are not suited for a reuseable role because they "force designers to extremes which were known to be unnecessary "for other types of boosters." Lockheed, in fact, proposed a stage and a half design, called "Starclipper" which was "technologically feasible" and "reasonably economical."

(2) Both a solid-fuel booster and the space shuttle could have been more competently and safely designed. In 1973 Aerojet Solid Propulsion Co. offered a booster that could have been manufactured in one piece, thus eliminating the sealing problem entirely. Thiokol, with a multi-unit booster that required seals, got the bid, however, even though their bid was ranked last out of four competitors. Presumably tongue-in-cheek, Brosz states. "The fact that the chairman of the Senate budget committee in control of NASA'S budget was Senator Frank Moss from Utah, or the fact that James Fletcher was an ex-president of the university of Utah and his wife was from Brigham City, Utah (Thiokol's hometown) doubtless had little to do with the decision." As far as the safety of the shuttle itself was concerned, McDonnell Douglas proposed a shuttle that included abort options "at every point during the flight." In addition, McDonnell Douglas engineers designed sensors to detect and neutralize a number of possible failures, including "O"-ring leakage. With Challenger Mission 51-L, none of the crew knew the right solid booster was failing until it was too late. These safety features, says Grosz, could have been incorporated into the Challenger at a "minuscule cost."

In short: the Challenger disaster happened because NASA, as is usual for a government agency, makes its choices for political, not engineering, reasons.

For Prometheus readers the above information may not be surprising. Libertarian publications have outlined NASA's failings and have described the often underhanded means by which the agency kept their monopoly status in the space field. (See Patrick Cox's article, "Space Entrepreneurs," in the January, 1985 issue of Reason.) The good news for libertarians interested in space exploration, however, is that the American public is now getting the message as well. Even more importantly, alternatives to NASA are not only being considered but are being encouraged.

You see, the government is now in a bind. The Soviets are having great success with their own space program. Military projects, secret and reportedly important to the Defense Department, are being delayed. U.S. scientists now have to take a back seat as other countries continue their own scientific projects—a major opportunity for the U.S. to study Halley's comet has been lost. As for U.S. commitments to commercial satellite launchings—seven satellites were scheduled for shuttle launching this year and nineteen were scheduled for next—and there is no alternative except for the European Space Agency's Ariane program, which has had three costly accidents in sixteen missions since 1979.

Into the breach several companies, which until now were hassled or ignored by the government, are being encouraged to produce satellite launchers. Some hope to have their first commercial flights within two years. Houston's Space Services will use its Conestoga II rocket for lightweight satellites. Maryland's Transpace Carriers will launch larger satellites on Delta rockets. Investors, reports Time's Stephen Koepp in the March 31 issue, are suddenly interested in private space ventures.

What is really unfortunate is that it took a disaster of this magnitudes and the loss of seven lives to end the government monopoly in space.

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